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Critical Race theorists have sought to provide counter accounts
of social reality. In particular, they have sought to create new,
oppositionist accounts of race.2 In this regard, Critical Race Theory
has evolved into several projects.
One project has sought to uncover how law is a constitutive
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1 See CRiTICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRMNGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEmENT xiii (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter, CRICAL
RACE THEORY]. See also John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp,
and Fire Music: Securing An Authentic Intellectual Life in A Multicultural World,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992). Calmore observes that critical race theorists are
the unew interpreters" who contend that the large texts of law, society and culture
must be subjected to fundamental criticism and reinterpretation. See id. at 2162-
64.
2 See CRITIcAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at xiii.
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element of race itself.3 Put another way, this project has sought to
identify how law constructed race.4 Another important project has
focused on the way that whiteness functions as a social organizing
principle.5 Thus, critical theorists have begun to examine how the
privilege of being white works in our society.6
As to this second project, critical theorists have recognized that
traditionally, white identity has been a source of privilege and
protection.7 Indeed, during the time of slavery in this country,
because whites could not be enslaved, the racial divide between
black and white became a line of protection from the threat of
commodification: whiteness protected one against being an object
of property.8 The status of being white was therefore a valuable
asset and carried with it a set of assumptions, privileges and
benefits. 9 Given this, it is hardly surprising that minorities have
often sought to "pass" as white - i.e., present themselves as white
3 See id. at xxv.
4 See id. See also Martha .Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness and
Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1660 (1995). Critical scholarship has
shown that race is a social construction. See id.
5 See CRmCAL RACE THEORY: THE CuTrNG EDGE 541 (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995).
6 See id. at 541. See also Mahoney, supra note 4, at 1663 ("Recently, social
and legal theorists have begun to 'interrogate whiteness'"); BELL HOOKS,
YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS 54 (1990) (discussing the
need to "interrogate whiteness"); RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHrrE WOMEN, RACE
MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993) (examining the
place of white women in the racial structure of the United States); Barbara J.
Flagg, 'Was Blind But Now I See. • White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953 (1993).
7 See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1721
(1993).
8 See id. at 1721.
9 See id. at 1713. See also Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis,
Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 881, 893-94 (1995) (defining white privilege as "an invisible package of
unearned assets" which is "like an invisible weightless knapsack of special
provisions, assurance, tools, maps, guides, code-books, passports, visas, clothes,
compass, emergency gear, and blank checks").
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persons.' 0 They did so because they thought that becoming white
insured greater economic, political and social security." Becoming
white, they thought, meant gaining access to a whole set of public
and private privileges, and was a way to avoid being the object of
others' domination. 2 Whiteness, therefore, constituted a privileged
identity.
In light of the privileged status of whiteness and these important
critical race projects, this essay seeks to examine a number of issues
concerning Mexican-Americans and whiteness. In particular, this
essay seeks to examine how legal actors - courts and others --
constructed the race of Mexican-Americans. In this regard, the
essay seeks to examine whether the law constructed Mexican-
Americans as white and whether they received the benefits
traditionally associated with whiteness. The essay also explores the
importance of group definition and argues that an examination of
whiteness and Mexican-Americans has implications for the
affirmative action debate. The article also explores how the legally
defined race of Mexican-Americans contrasted with the colonial
discourses that developed in the American southwest and which
characterized Mexican-Americans as racial Others. In addition, the
essay seeks to explain why Mexican-Americans were legally
classified as white. The essay also seeks to link theory with
practice. Toward that end, the essay briefly suggests how some of
the insights of Critical Race Theory developed in this paper may be
useful for litigators representing Mexican-Americans.
10 See Harris, supra note 7, at 1710, 1713. For other discussions of the
phenomenon of "passing," see GuNNAR MYRDAL, 1 AN AMERICAN DILE MA:
THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 683-86 (1996). Myrdal writes
that "'Passing' means that a Negro becomes a white man, that is, moves from the
lower to the higher caste. In the American caste order, this can be accomplished
only by the deception of white people with whom the passer comes to associate
and by a conspiracy of silence on the part of other Negroes who might know
about it." Id. at 683. See also MARVIN HARRis, PATrERNs OF RACE IN THE
AMERICAS 39-40, 56-59 (1964).
11 See Harris, supra note 7, at 1713.
12 See Id.
Harvard Latino Law Review I LatCrit Symposium
Beyond this, this essay seeks to help construct LatCrit Theory.
Although a number of Latinos have been important practitioners of
Critical Race Theory, few articles have applied critical theory to
matters of particular concern to Latinos. n This essay seeks to help
fill this void in the literature.
Part 11 of this essay describes how the courts and other legal
actors constructed the race of Mexican-Americans. It concludes that
for the most part legal actors constructed the race of Mexican-
Americans as "white." Part II discusses the importance of legal
definition - e.g., defining a group as white or in some other way --
for historically oppressed groups. It analyzes how dominant-group-
controlled institutions may use power over minority group identity
to reinforce group oppression. Part IV observes that although
Mexican-Americans were legally defined as "white," they did not
receive the benefits traditionally associated with whiteness. This
section argues that this illustrates a principle developed by critical
theorists - the principle of marginality - which holds that legal
rules and doctrines often fail to impact on society. Part V argues
that the fact that Mexican-Americans did not receive the benefits
usually associated with whiteness has implications for the
affirmative action debate. Part VI argues that the legal construction
of Mexican-Americans as white is ironic. It is at odds with the
1
13 For examples of articles applying critical theory to issues of concern to
Latinos, see Berta Esperanza Hern ndez-Truyol, Building Bridges - Latinas and
Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the
Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and
Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REv. 1139 (1993); George A. Martinez, Legal
Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation
Experience 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 555 (1994); Margaret E.
Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding
Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 185 (1994);
Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration
Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L. J. 425
(1990); Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70
N.Y.U. L. REv. 965 (1995).
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colonial discourses that developed in the American Southwest. Such
discourses characterized Mexican-Americans as a racial Other. In
light of their discursive production as racial Others, it is puzzling
that Mexican-Americans were legally constructed as white. Part VII
seeks to explain why Mexican-Americans were legally classified as
"white."
II. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RACE OF
MEXICAN-AMERICANS
Critical theory has recognized that race is a social or legal
construction.'4 Racial categories are constructed through the give-
and-take of politics or social interaction.' Thus, race is not a
prelegal phenomenon or an independent given on which the law
acts.16 Race is instead a social construction at least in part fashioned
by law. 7 How did the courts and other legal actors construct the
race of Mexican-Americans?
A. The Case Law
A number of courts have construed the race of Mexican-
Americans. 8 A few examples will suffice to make the relevant
14 See IAN F. HANEY L6Psz, WHIrE BY LAW 12 (1996); Mahoney, supra note
4, at 1661 (Race is a social construction, not a 'a natural division of human-
kind'"). See also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 'Our Constitution Is Color Blind, "
44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Ian F. Haney IApez, The Social Construction of
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R. -
C.L. L. REv. 1 (1994).
15 See Luis Angel Toro, 4 People Distinct From Others: "Race and Identity In
Federal Indian Law and the Hispanic Classification In OMB Directive No. 15, 26
Tx. TECH. L. REv. 1219, 1244 (1995).
16 See HANEY L6PEz, WHITE BY LAW, supra note 14, at 13.
17 See id. at 13.
18 C. Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial
Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CAL. L. REV. 662 (1975).
Greenfield and Kates analyze the race of Mexican-Americans for purposes of the
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points. In Inland Steel Co. v. Barcena,19 an Indiana appellate court
addressed the question of whether Mexicans were white. The court
noted that the Encyclopedia Britannica stated that approximately
one-fifth of the inhabitants of Mexico were whites, approximately
two-fifths were Indians, and the balance was made up of mixed
bloods, blacks, Japanese, and Chinese. Given this, the court held
that a "Mexican" should not necessarily be construed to be a white
person.2°
The Texas courts also considered the race of Mexican-
Americans. In In re Rodriquez, 21 a Texas federal court addressed
in an immigration context the question of whether Mexicans were
white. At that time, the federal naturalization laws required that an
alien be white in order to become a citizen of the United States.2
There, the court stated that Mexicans would probably be considered
non-white from an anthropological perspective z The court noted,
however, that the United States had entered into certain treaties with
Mexico. Those treaties expressly allowed Mexicans to become
citizens of the United States.24 Under these circumstances, the court
concluded that Congress intended that Mexicans were entitled to
become citizens. Thus, the court held that Mexicans were white
within the meaning of the naturalization laws .25
In re Rodriquez is an important case. It clearly reveals how
racial categories can be constructed through the political process.
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and discuss some of the legal materials mentioned in this
section. They, however, do not analyze the race of Mexican-Americans through
the lens of social construction or critical theory - this essay seeks to do so.
19 39 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1942).
20 Id. at 801.
21 81 F. 337 (W.D. Tex. 1897).
22 See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Restrictions on Naturalization: The Recurring
Intersection of Race and Gender in Immigration and Citizenship Law, 11
BEIULEY WOMEN'S L.J. 142, 143 (1996) (from 1790 to 1952 only white
immigrants could naturalize as citizens).
23 See In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337 at 349.
24 Id. at 350-52.
25 Id. at 354-55.
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Through the give and take of treaty making, Mexicans became
"white".
That politics operated to turn Mexicans into whites is revealed
in analogous cases which considered whether mixed race persons
were white under the immigration laws. In general, mixed race
applicants failed to establish their whiteness.26 For example, in In
re Camille27 the court held that the son of a white Canadian father
and an Indian mother was non-white, and therefore, was denied the
right of naturalization. Similarly, in In re Young, 8 the son of a
German father and a Japanese mother was not a white person within
the meaning of the immigration laws? 9 It seems plausible to read
these cases to stand for the proposition that mixed race persons are
not considered white. Given this, it appears that Mexicans - a
mixture of Spanish and Indian - should not have counted as white.
The treaties nevertheless operated to turn them into whites.
The issue of the race of Mexican-Americans also arose in the
context of school segregation. In Independent School District v.
Salvatierra,30 plaintiffs sought to enjoin segregation of Mexican-
Americans in the City of Del Rio, Texas. There, the court treated
Mekican-Americans as white, holding .that Mexican-Americans
could not be segregated from children of "other white races, merely
26 See HANEY L6PEZ, The Social Constiuction of Race, supra note 14, at 2.
27 6 F. 256 (Or. Ct. App. 1880).
28 198 F. 715 (N.D. 1912).
29 See id. at 716-717. The court observed:
In the abstractions of higher mathematics, it may be plausibly said that
the half of infinity is equal to the whole of infinity; but in the case of
such a concrete thing as the person of a human being it cannot be said
that one who is half white and half brown or yellow is a white person,
as commonly understood.
Id. at 717.
30 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). Salvatierra was the first case to
decide the issue of whether segregation of Mexican-Americans in public schools
was permissible. See Martinez, supra note 13, at 574. For more discussion of
the Salvaierra case, see GUADALUPE SAN MIGUEL, JR., "LET ALL OF THEM TAKE
HEED": MEIcAN AMERICANS AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR EDUCAIONAL EQUALITY
IN TE As, 1910-1981, at 78-80 (1987).
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or solely because they are Mexicans."31 Significantly, the court did
permit segregation of Mexican-Americans on the basis of linguistic
difficulties and migrant farming patterns.3'
Mexican-American participation on juries also involved the
construction of the race of Mexican-Americans. For example, in
Hernandez v. State,33 a Mexican-American had been convicted of
murder. He sought to reverse his conviction on the ground that
Mexican-Americans had been excluded from the grand jury and the
petit jury. He relied on cases holding that exclusion of blacks from
jury service constituted a violation of due process and equal
protection?4 The court recognized only two classes as falling within
the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment: the white race and the
black race.35 The court held that Mexican-Americans are white
people, and therefore, fall within the classification of the white race
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment? 6 The court reasoned
that to say that the members of the various groups comprising the
white race must be represented on grand and petit juries would
destroy the jury system.37 Since the juries that indicted and
convicted the defendant were composed of members of his race -
white persons - he had not been denied the equal protection of the
laws.38
31 33 S.W.2d at 795.
32 See id. at 795; Martinez, supra note 13, at 575-76.
33 251 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1952).
34 See id. at 532.
35 See id. at 535.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 536. In Sanchez v. State, 243 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App.
1951) a Mexican-American had been convicted of murder. He sought to
challenge his conviction on the ground that his due process rights had been
violated because the county had discriminated against Mexican-Americans in the
selection of grand jurors. The Texas court held that Mexican-Americans are not
a separate race, but are white people of Spanish descent. Id. at 701. Thus, the
defendants' rights were not violated because whites were not excluded from the
grand juries.
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B. The Census Bureau
Federal agencies also constructed the race of Mexican-
Americans. The federal government compiled census data on
persons of Mexican descent? 9 In 1930, the Census Bureau made
the first effort to identify Mexican-Americans. The Bureau used
the term "Mexican" to classify Mexican-Americans and it was
placed under the rubric of "other races" which also included Indians,
Blacks and Asians.4' According to this definition, Mexican-
Americans were not considered "whites"4 2 Interestingly, the
Mexican government and the United States Department of State both
objected to the 1930 census definition of Mexican.43 Thus, in the
1950 census Mexican-Americans were classified as "whites". 4 The
Census Bureau experience is significant in that it presents another
example of how politics have influenced the construction of the race
of Mexican-Americans.
C. The Office of Management and Budget
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has set forth the
current federal law of racial classification 5 In particular, Statistical
Directive No. 15 deals with Mexican-Americans. 46 Directive No.
15 governs the collection of federal statistics regarding the
implementation of a number of civil rights laws.47 According to





44 See id. at 601-02.
45 See Toro, supra note 15, at 1221.
46 See Directive No. 15, Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and
Administrative Reporting, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,260, 19,269 (Off. Mgmt. & Budget
1978).
47 See Toro, supra note 15, at 1225.
Harvard Latino Law Review / LatCrit Symposium
Directive No. 15, Mexican-Americans are classified as white.48
The record shows, then, that for the most part the courts and
other legal actors constructed the race of Mexican-Americans as
"white."49 That conclusion is interesting in and of itself. But is
there anything else that is significant about group definition? Why
is legal definition of a group significant?
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL SELF-DEFINITION
FOR HISTORICALLY OPPRESSED GROUPS
Dominant-group-controlled institutions have determined the
legal meaning of minority group identity.5 The law has recognized
racial group identity when such identity was a basis for exclusion
and subordination.5 The law, however, often has refused to
recognize group identity when asserted by racially oppressed groups
as a basis for affirming rights and resisting subordination 2 Thus,
dominant-group-controlled institutions often have defined racial
groups and have imposed those definitions on those groups as a way
to maintain the status quo - i.e., racial subordination.
Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee5 is instructive on this
point. There, the Indian community at Mashpee on Cape Cod sued
to recover tribal lands alienated from them over the last two
hundred years in violation of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of
1790.54 The Non-Intercourse Act prohibits the transfer of Indian
tribal land to non-Indians without approval of the federal
48 See id. at 1227.
49 Cf. Greenfield & Kates, supra note 18, at 687 (observing that the case law
gives "some indication that Mexican-Americans were not officially to be treated
as a nonwhite group").
50 See Harris, supra note 7, at 1761.
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 447 F.Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978).
54 See Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio By Precedent
and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 633.
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government.55 The Tribe argued that its land had been taken from
it without the required federal consent 6 The defendant, Town of
Mashpee, answered by denying that the plaintiffs Mashpee were a
Tribe.57 Therefore they fell outside the protection of the Non-
Intercourse Act and had no standing to sue.5"
In order to recover the land, the Mashpee were required to
prove that they were a Tribe at the time of conveyance 9 Accepting
the definition of "Tribe" as stated in earlier case law, the trial judge
defined "Tribe" as a "body of Indians of the same or similar race,
united in a community under one leadership or government, and
inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory. '
The court held that the Mashpee were not a Tribe at the time the
suit was filed. The court rejected their claim to land rights based on
group identity.61
For the Mashpee, the court's standard was not the appropriate
measure of group identity. Their identity as a group was
demonstrated by their continued relationship to the land of the
Mashpee and their awareness and preservation of cultural
traditions.62 The Tribe, however, was incapable of legal self-
definition. 63 Instead, the court imposed a definition or standard of
group identity in order to maintain the status quo and resist their
claim of right to be free from subordination.6 The lesson of the
Mashpee case seems clear: dominant-group-controlled institutions
should not have exclusive power to define minority group identity.
Historically dominated groups must struggle for the power of legal





59 See Harris, supra note 7, at 1764.
60 Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
61 See Mashpee, 447 F.Supp. at 950.
62 See Harris, supra note 7, at 1765.
63 See id.
64 See id.
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may use the power over meaning and group identity to reinforce
group oppression.
We -have seen this phenomenon in the cases dealing with
Mexican-Americans. As discussed, in Hernandez, the Texas court
controlled the legal meaning of the identity of Mexican-Americans.
There, Mexican-Americans sought to assert a group identity - the
status of being a distinct group - in an effort to resist oppression --
i.e., being excluded from grand and petit juries. The Texas court
refused to recognize their group identity. Instead, the Texas court
imposed a definition of "white" on Mexican-Americans so as to
maintain the status quo - i.e., exclusion from juries.
Subsequently, on review, the United States Supreme Court also
imposed a group definition on Mexican-Americans. The Court held
in Hernandez v. Texaso that "persons of Mexican descent" are a
cognizable group for equal protection purposes in areas where they
are subject to local discrimination.' Thus, in areas where Mexican-
Americans are unable to prove the existence of discriminatory
treatment, they lack sufficient definitional clarity as a class to
warrant fourteenth amendment protection.67 Defining Mexican-
Americans in terms of the existence of local discrimination hinders
Mexican-Americans in asserting their rights.68 The Hernandez
approach operates to impose artificially high standards on Mexican-
American plaintiffs in that not every plaintiff can afford the expense
of obtaining expert testimony to prove the required local prejudice.69
Thus, the Supreme Court's definition of Mexican-Americans in
terms of local prejudice is another example of imposing a group
def'nition on Mexican-Americans which has the potential effect of
subordinating Mexican-Americans.
65 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
66 Id. at 477-79.
67 See Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Americans As A Legally
Cognizable Class Under Rule 23 and the Equal Protection Clause 50 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 393, 395 (1975).
68 See id. at 401.
69 See id. at 400-01.
Volume 2, Fall 1997
Similarly, in Lopez Tijerina v. Henry," the court refused to
allow Mexican-Americans to define themselves as a group.
Plaintiffs sought to bring a class action on behalf of the class of
"Mexican-Americans" in order to secure equal educational
opportunity for Mexican-Americans. The court rejected the claim
for class representation, holding that the term "Mexican-American"
was too vague and failed to adequately define a class within the
meaning of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
governing class actions.7 ' Since the class was not adequately
defined, the court dismissed the class action complaint. 2
Class actions permit a lawsuit to be brought by large numbers
of persons whose interests are sufficiently related so that it is more
efficient to adjudicate their rights in a single action. Significantly,
the class action device may represent the only viable procedure for
people with small claims to vindicate their rights or for important
social issues to be litigated.74 Thus, the court's refusal to permit the
class action may have meant that the Mexican-Americans would not
have been able to pursue the important social issues raised by the
complaint. Given this, the Lopez Tijerina case seems to be an
example of a court refusing to allow Mexican-Americans to define
themselves so as to resist oppression.
Subsequently, other courts permitted Mexican-Americans to sue
as a class under Rule 23 by distinguishing TUerina under the
Hernandez rationale that local prejudice rendered the class
sufficiently identifiable.75 Thus, the courts defined Mexican-
Americans in terms of local prejudice, a definition which, for the
reasons discussed above, operated to the disadvantage of Mexican-
70 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969).
71 See 48 F.R.D. at 276.
72 See id. at 277. For additional discussion of the Lopez TUerina case, see
generally Delgado & Palacios, supra note 67.
73 See JACK H. FRIEDENTmAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 721-22 (2d. ed.
1993).
74 See 1d. at 722.
75 See Delgado & Palacios, supra note 67, at 401.
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Americans in their efforts to assert their rights under Rule 23.76
A. Theory and Practice
Contemporary litigators representing Mexican-Americans need
to be aware of the critical insight that legal self-definition is
important. For example, they might use that insight to motivate a
challenge to the current definition of "Hispanic" under the federal
regulations. The current "Hispanic" classification operates to
prevent Mexican-Americans from overcoming disadvantages
imposed by racial subordination. Hispanics are .defined in
Directive No. 15 as a white ethnic group. 8 This creates a serious
problem: it allows white persons - persons of European extraction
- to claim benefits meant to address the problems associated with
racism.79 This occurs when a person who is identified in the
community as being a part of the Anglo majority claims to be a
member of a racially subordinated minority group and uses that
status to receive benefits meant to address the problems that group
faces."0 The net result is that the "Hispanic" classification is yet
another legal definition imposed on Mexican-Americans which
results in the subordination of Mexican-Americans.
IV. THE MARGINALITY OF LAW
Classical legal theory holds, among other things, that social
action reflects norms generated by the legal system.81 That older
76 See id.
77 See Toro, supra note 15, at 1223.
78 See id. at 1227.
79 See id. at 1253.
80 See id.
81 See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575, 577 (1984). Classical legal theory or the
idea of legal order also holds that (1) the law is in some sense a system that
provides an answer to all questions about social behavior; (2) a form of reasoning
exists that can be employed by specialists to generate necessary answers from
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tradition has been challenged in recent years.- According to the
critique of legal order,s3 even under those circumstances in which
a consensus can be formed about the norms of the law, there is no
reason to believe that law is a decisive factor in social behavior.8
4
Legal rules often are only of marginal impact in daily life. This is
called the principle of marginality.' The principle of marginality
holds, then, that legal rules, doctrines and institutions often fail to
impact on society."
For example, the critics of legal order have demonstrated the
marginality of contract law in the realm of business Y Stewart
Macauley has described the marginality of state enforced norms in
the governance of contract relations.88 He found that business
persons did not rely on legal norms to define or sanctions to enforce
their relations.89 Thus, when "contracting" business persons did not
consciously shape their conduct to conform to the requirements of
law.9°
This essay began with the observation that white identity
traditionally has been a source of privilege and protection. As
discussed, for the most part, the courts and federal government
constructed the race of Mexican-Americans as white. Since the law
recognized Mexican-Americans as white, one might have expected,
doctrine; and (3) this doctrine reflects a coherent view about the basic relations
between persons and about the nature of society. See id.
82 See id.
83 The critique of legal order challenges the idea that a legal order exists in any
society. See id. The critique is based on four principles: indeterminacy,
antiformalism, contradiction and marginality. See id. at 577-78.
84 See id. at 578.
85 See id.
86 See id. at 615.
87 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CiN.
L. REv. 1283, 1305 (1990).
88 See Robert W. Gordon, Macauley, Macneil and the Discovery of Solidarity
and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIs. L. REy. 565, 571.
89 See id.
90 See Feinman, supra note 87, at 1306.
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if classical legal theory were correct, that social action would have
reflected the Mexican-American's privileged legal status as white.
That, however, was not the case. Consistent with the critique of
legal order, legal recognition of the Mexican-American as white had
only a marginal impact on conduct.
Far from having a privileged status, Mexican-Americans faced
discrimination very similar to that experienced by African-
Americans. 91 Thus, Mexican-Americans were excluded from public
facilities and neighborhoods, and were the targets of racial slurs.
Mexican-Americans typically lived in one section of town because
they were not permitted to rent or own property anywhere except in
the "Mexican Colony," regardless of their social, educational or
economic status. 3 Similarly, Mexican-Americans were segregated
in public schools.94 Mexican-Americans have also faced significant
discrimination in the area of employment.' Mexican-Americans
were earmarked for exclusive employment in the lowest brackets of
employment.96 They were paid less than Anglo-Americans for the
same jobs.97 Moreover, law enforcement officials have committed
widespread discrimination against Mexican-Americans. 98 In this
regard, Mexican-Americans have been subjected to unduly harsh
91 See generally Martinez, supra note 13. See also, Paul Brest & Miranda
Oshige, Affirmative Action For Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855, 888 (1995)
("Latinos have encountered prejudice and systematic discrimination in virtually
all realms, including housing, employment and educationn).
92 See Martinez, supra note 13, at 573.
93 See P. KIBBE, LAnN AmElicANS IN TExAs 123-24 (1946).
94 See Martinez, supra note 13, at 584. See also SAN MIGUEL, supra note 30,
at 54-55. ("School officials and board members, reflecting the specific desires of
the general population, did not want Mexican students to attend school with Anglo
children regardless of their social standing, economic status, language capability,
or place of residence").
95 See, e.g., CAREY MCWILLIAMS, NoRTH FROM MnIco 195-97 (1948);
KIBBE, supra note 93, at 157.
96 See MCWiLL AMs, supra note 95, at 196.
97 See id.
98 See U.S. .Comm'n On Civil Rights, Mexican Americans and the
Administration of Justice in the Southwest (SUMMARY) 2 (1970).
Volume 2, Fall 1997
treatment by police, have been frequently arrested on insufficient
grounds and have received harrassment and penalties
disproportionately severe compared to those imposed on Anglos for
the same acts. 99 These facts seem to implicate the principle of
marginality. Actual social behavior - i.e., discrimination practiced
against Mexican-Americans - failed to reflect the legal norms that
defined Mexican-Americans as white. Although Mexican-
Americans were white as a matter of law, that law failed to provide
them with a privileged status. Their legal status as white persons
had only a marginal impact in daily life.
One of the most striking examples of the failure to provide the
traditional benefits associated with whiteness occurred in Texas.
Discrimination against Mexican-Americans in Texas had been
particularly egregious.' As a result, the Mexican Ministry of
Labor declared in 1943 that Mexican citizens would not be allowed
to go to Texas.'' Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla
informed Texas that Mexican citizens would be allowed to go to
Texas only after the wave of racial prejudice had subsided.'02 In
response, the Texas legislature, on May 6, 1943, passed a resolution
that established as a matter of Texas public policy that all
Caucasians were entitled to equal accommodations.' 03
Subsequently, Mexican-Americans attempted to rely on the
resolution and sought to claim one of the traditional benefits of
whiteness - freedom from exclusion from public places. In Terrell
Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez,1°4 Jacob Rodriguez sought an
injunction requiring the defendant swimming pool operator to offer
99 See id.
100 See Martinez, supra note 13, at 564 n.38; SAN MIGUEL, supra note 30, at 92
(the discrimination and mistreatment of Mexicans, both citizens and non-citizens,
was most flagrant in Texas"). Michael Olivas has observed that for Mexican-
Americans Texas is "our Mississippi". 2 MICHAEL OLIVAS, RECONSTRUCTION
50 (1993).
101 See Martinez, supra note 13, at 564 n.38; SAN MIGUEL, supra note 30, at 92.
102 See id. at 92-93.
103 See Martinez, supra note 13, at 564; SAN MIGUEL, supra note 30, at 93.
104 182 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
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equal accommodations to Mexican-Americans. Plaintiff argued that
he could not be excluded from the pool on the basis of his Mexican
ancestry because that would violate the public policy expressed in
the resolution condemning discrimatory practices against all persons
of the white race. The court refused to enforce the public policy on
the ground that the resolution did not have the effect of a statute. l s
Thus, Mexican-Americans could not claim one of the most
significant benefits of whiteness - freedom from exclusion from
public places.
A. Theory and Practice
Litigators representing Mexican-Americans can use the insight
of the principle of marginality.Y Historically, Mexican-Americans
have fought a battle against being legally defined as non-white. 7
They have done so because they believed that if they were defined
as "white" they would receive the rights and privileges traditionally
associated with being "white."0 8 That belief is mistaken. The
105 Terrell Wells, 112 S.W. 2d at 826.
106 In light of the principle of the marginality of law, it may seem incongruous
to resort to litigation. To be sure, Latinos should be circumspect about the
chances for litigation to improve the position of the Latino community. See Kevin
R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV.
LATIo L. REv. 101, 142 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and
Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century,
8 LA RAZA L. J. 42, 47 (1995) (discussing limited power of litigation alone to
bring about change for Latinos) [hereinafter Johnson, Challengesfor the Latino
Community]; See generally Martinez, supra note 13 (reviewing litigation
involving the interests of Mexican-Americans and concluding that courts often
resolved legal indeterminacy against Mexican-Americans). Despite the limits of
litigation, litigation is often necessary to bring about social change. See Johnson,
Challenges for the Latino Community, supra, at 55 ("litigation obviously is a
necessary weapon in any movement to facilitate social change"). To successfully
bring about social change, however, litigation must be tied to a broader-based
political and social movement. See Id.
107 See Grebler, supra note 39, at 385.
108 See id.
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Mexican-Americans' legal status of being white did not protect
Mexican-Americans in the past. Therefore, it seems likely that it
will not protect Mexican-Americans in the present or in the future.
Thus, persons representing Mexican-Americans should not hesitate
to challenge harmful legal definitions establishing Mexican-
Americans as white - e.g. OMB Directive No. 15.'09
V. MEXICAN-AMERICANS, WHITENESS AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
That Mexican-Americans have not benefited from their legal
construction as white has implications for affirnative action.
Although the meaning of "affirmative action" is somewhat
unclear,110 it generally refers to attempts to bring members of
underrepresented groups into a higher degree of participation in
some beneficial program."1 Affirmative action often includes some
kind of preferential treatment.112 In particular, affirmative action
often refers to preferential hiring or admission of minorities and
women.13 Mexican-Americans have benefited from affirmative-
109 In this connection, see Roger Sanjek, Intermarriage and the Future of Races
in the United States, in RACE 120 (Steven Gregory and Roger Sanjek, eds. 1994).
Sanjek observes that in recent decades an increasing number of Hispanics are
answering 'other" to the U.S. Census race question, rejecting white. See id.
Interestingly, some Egyptians have objected to their classification as white by the
United States government. See Soheir A. Morsy, Beyond the Honorary 'White"
Classification of Egyptians: Societal Identity in Historical Context, in RACE 175-
198 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994). They reject the uwhiteb
designation in favor of an African cultural identity. See id. at 175.
110 See MICHAEL ROsENFELD, AFFEmATvE ACnON AND JUSTICE 42 (1991).
111 See Id. For recent discussions of affirmative action, see generally Brest &
Oshige, supra note 91; Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action As A Majoritarian
Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be A Role Model, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222
(1991); Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82
CAL. L. REv. 893 (1994); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for
Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705.
112 See Rosenfeld, supra note 110, at 47.
113 See id.
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action programs. 14 Some scholars, however, recently have
suggested that Mexican-Americans should not benefit from
affirmative action programs because they are white."'
Critical theory reveals the flaw in this line of argument. Critical
theorists have recognized that affirmative action is required to de-
legitimate the property interest in whiteness." 6 Affirmative action
seeks to dismantle the actual and expected privileges traditionally
associated with being white."7 Affirmative action, then, de-
privileges whiteness and seeks to remove the legal protections of
whiteness.1 8 Given this analysis of affirmative action, it is clear
that Mexican-Americans should not be excluded from preferential
treatment programs because they are white. As discussed above,
Mexican-Americans have not significantly benefited from their legal
construction as white. They have not received the benefits usually
associated with whiteness. Thus, they should not be excluded from
affirmative action programs on the ground that they are white.
Since Mexican-Americans were never significantly privileged by
whiteness, it makes no sense to de-privilege them by excluding them
from preferential treatment programs.
VI. COLONIAL DISCOURSES AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF WHITENESS
The legal construction of Mexican-Americans as white is ironic.
It is at odds with the colonial discourses - i.e., the discursive
repertoires associated with the process of colonial exploration and
114 See, e.g., Brest & Oshige, supra note 91, at 855.
115 See id. at 888-90. Brest and Oshige point out that the case for affirmative
action for Latinos is weakened by, among other things, the fact that Latinos were
traditionally classified as whites. See id. I am indebted to Rachel Moran for
helpful discussion on this point. For further discussion of this issue, see Rachel
Moran, Unrepresented, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 139 (1996).
116 See Harris, supra note 7, at 1779.
117 See id.
118 See id.
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ruling119 - that developed in the American Southwest. There are
close ties in the United States between racist and colonial discourses
as well as between constructions of whiteness and Westernness."'
Scholars of the era of West European colonial expansion have
documented the centrality of the production of knowledge - i.e., the
discourses on the colonized that the colonizer produced - to the
success of colonial rule.121 The colonizers engaged in epistemic
violence - i.e., produced modes of knowing that enabled and
rationalized colonial domination from the standpoint of the West,
and produced ways of viewing "Other" societies and cultures whose
legacies endure into the present." Central to colonial discourses is
the notion of the colonized subject irreducibly Other from the
standpoint of a white self.12
119 See FRANKENBERG, supra note 6, at 16.
120 See id. See also ROBERT YOUNG, WHITE MYTHOLOGIES: WRITING HISTORY
AND THE WEsT 173 (1990) ("the creation of an object of analysis called 'colonial
discourse', has proved one of the most fruitful and significant areas of
research...and the concept of colonial discourse.. .has been extended to other
categories such as 'minority discourse', and is increasingly being used to describe
certain power structures within the hierarchies of the West itself, particularly the
relation of minorities to the dominant group").
121 See FRANKENBERG, supra note 6, at 16. See also YOUNG, supra note 120,
at 127 (analysts of the colonial era have demonstrated the "deep complicity of
academic forms of knowledge with institutions of power").
122 See FRANKENBERG, supra note 6, at 16. See also YOUNG supra note 120,
at 158 ("analysis of colonial discourse.. .demonstrates that history is not simply
the disinterested production of facts, but is rather a process of 'epistemic
violence', an interested construction of a particular representation of an object,
which may.. -.be entirely constructed with no existence or reality outside its
representation").
123 See FRANKENBERG, supra note 6, at 16-17. See also EDWARD W. SAID,
ORMNTALISM 228 (1978). Said writes:
Every statement made by Orientalists or White Men (who were usually
interchangeable) conveyed a sense of the irreducible distance separating
white from colored, or Occidental from Oriental; moreover, behind each
statement there resonated the tradition of experience, learning and
education that kept the Oriental-colored to his position of object studied
by the Occidental-white, instead of vice versa.
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One can view the history of Mexican-Americans in the United
States as part of the larger history of western colonialism. 24 The
Anglo colonizers in the American Southwest produced discourses
regarding the Mexican-Americans. In sharp contrast to their legal
construction as white, these discourses plainly construed Mexican-
Americans as irreducibly Other from the standpoint of the white
Anglo. A few examples will suffice. The historian David Weber
writes:
Anglo Americans found an additional element to despise in
Mexicans: racial mixture. American visitors to the Mexican
frontier were nearly unanimous in commenting on the dark
skin of Mexican mestizos, who, it was generally agreed had
inherited the worst qualities of Spaniards and Indians to
produce a 'race' still more despicable than that of either
parent. 15
Similarly, another commentator described how Anglo Americans
drew a racial distinction between themselves and Mexican-
Americans:
Racial myths about Mexicans appeared as soon as Mexicans
began to meet Anglo American settlers in the early
nineteenth century. The differences in attitudes,
temperament, and behavior were supposed to be genetic. It
Id. at 228.
124 See Angela Harris, Forward: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL.
L. REv. 741, 763 (1994) (citing BENjAMN B. RINGER & ELINOR R. LAWLEsS,
RACE-ETMHNICITY AND SoCMIE, (1989) (the United States should be considered a
colonial society with respect to its racial minorities); RODOLFO ACUNA,
OCCUPIED AMEmCA: THE CICANO's STRUGGLE TowARD LIBERATION iii (1972)
(arguing that the experience of Mexican-Americans in the American Southwest
parallels that of other Third World peoples who have suffered under the
colonialism of technologically superior nations).
125 FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE MEXICAN
AMERICANS 59-60 (David J. Weber ed., 1973).
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is hard now to imagine the normal Mexican mixture of
Spanish and Indian as constituting a distinct 'race,' but the
Anglo Americans of the Southwest defined it as such.'26
Likewise, the dean of Texas historians, Walter Prescott Webb
wrote:
Without disparagement it may be said that there is a cruel
streak in the Mexican nature, or so the history of Texas
would lead one to believe. This cruelty may be a heritage
from the Spanish of the Inquisition; it may, and doubtless
should, be attributed partly to the Indian blood. 7
One effect of this colonial discourse was to generate a racial Other
- the Mexican-American - in contrast to an unmarked white/Anglo
self.1
28
Through this discourse on the Mexican-American, Anglo
Americans also reformulated their white selves. Analysts of
colonial expansion have recognized that while discursively
126 J. MOORE, MIacAN AMERIcANs 1 (1970). See also AcUNA, supra note
124, at 7 (uAnglo-Americans arriving in the Southwest believed that they were
racially superior to the swarthy Mexicans, whom they considered a mongrel race
of Indian halfbreeds.").
127 WALTER PRESCOrr WEBB, THE TEXAS RANGERs: A CENTURY OF FRONTIER
DEFENSE 14 (1965).
128 In their discourse, then, the Anglo colonizers took a very negative view of
the mixed-race Mexican-American. Interestingly, Mexican thinkers developed
a much more positive view of racial mixture. For example, the Mexican
philosopher, Jose Vasconcelos, predicted that a "raza cosmica or "cosmic race"
would emerge to fulfill the divine mission of America. See PATRICK ROMANELL,
THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN MIND 133 (1971). This raza cosmica would
represent the synthesis of the various races. See id. Vasconcelos also argued that
North Americans act on the anti-human and anti-Christian principle of racial
segregation. See id. In contrast, Latin Americans act on the opposite principle
of mestizaje. See id. As a result, Vasconcelos concluded that the germ of the
raza cosmica of the future is to be found in the hybrid peoples of Latin America.
See id.
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generating and marking a range of racial Others as different from an
apparently stable white self, the unmarked, apparently autonomous
white self is itself produced as an effect of colonial discourse.
29
The white self and the racial Other are coconstructed as discursive
products. 30 Thus, whiteness seems comprehensible to many only
by reference to racial Others.' Perhaps surprisingly, then, it is
precisely by means of a construction of a range of racial Others that
the white self constitutes itself." Thus, through colonial discourse
regarding Mexican-Americans, Anglos were able to construct
themselves.
In this regard, it is possible to identify the operation of a
dualism - Anglo versus Other - in the colonial discourse regarding
Mexican-Americans. Their descriptions of cultural difference were
dualistic. Anglo whiteness was apparently comprehensible only by
reference to the Mexican Other. Foi: example, one commentator
writes:
In the comparison Anglos made, the cultural structure of
Mexicans was the antithesis of theirs. Where whites were
energetic, Mexicans seemed backward; where whites were
ambitious and aggressive, Mexicans seemed apathetic and
complacent; where whites considered themselves inventive,
Mexicans seemed anachronistic; and where whites knew
their direction, Mexicans appeared to be going nowhere.'
129 See FRANKENBERG, supra note 6, at 17.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See Ruth Frankenberg, Whiteness and Americanness: Examining
Constructions of Race, Culture and Nation in White Women's Life Narratives, in
RACE 63 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994).
133 ARNOLDO DE LEON, THEY CALLED THEM GREASERS: ANGLO ATTruDEs
TOWARD MEXICANS IN TEXAS, 1821-1900 at 24 (1983). Cf. SAID, supra note 123.
In describing the colonial discourse on the Orient, Said observed how such
discourse showed the Oriental to be the opposite of the Westerner. For example,
Said quotes England's representative in Egypt as follows:
As I am only a diplomatist and an administrator, whose proper study is
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Marking the Mexican-American as a racial Other may also be
viewed as inscribing the Mexican-American with a figurative
border. Border theorists have discussed the significance of borders
for different racial groups."' They have recognized that the literal
border exists as an absolute police divide between two nations --
e.g., Mexico and the United States. 35 The border is defended
through state violence.136 The border also has a symbolic meaning:
it stands for the harsh relations of dominance and subordination
between Anglos and Mexicans. 37 Thus, the United States/Mexico
border and the symbolic border defining the relationship between
Anglos and Mexican-Americans constitute sites of violence and
personal vulnerability. 138  Given this, marking the Mexican-
American as a racial Other means that the Mexican-American is
discursively produced as foreign. 139 Foreign-ness is inscribed on
their bodies in such a way that Mexican-Americans carry a
figurative border with them.' 4 As a result, Mexican-Americans are
always subject to the violence of heightened scrutiny that occurs at
the border.14' This burden is of large significance. For border
theorists, the border is everywhere.' 42
also man, but from the point of view of governing him... I content
myself with noting the fact that somehow or other the Oriental generally
acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European.
Id.
134 See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, A Meditation on Borders, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!:
THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANT-INMGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES
244 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1996); Renato Rosaldo, Race and Other Inequalities: The
Borderlands in Arturo Islas Migrant Souls, in RACE 213 (Steven Gregory &
Roger Sanjek eds., 1994).
135 See id. at 217.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 219.
139 Cf. Chang, supra note 134, at 247 (Asian-Americans are discursively
produced as foreign).
140 Cf. id. (Asian-Americans are marked by a figurative border).
141 Cf. id. (Asian-Americans are subject to greater scrutiny).
142 See id.
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VII. THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN AS RACIAL OTHER AND
LEGALLY WHITE
Given the discursive production of Mexican-Americans as racial
Others, why were Mexican-Americans legally constructed as white?
It seems that there were a number of reasons for this paradoxical
result. First, politics operated to turn Mexican-Americans into
whites. As discussed, in In re Rodriguez, Mexican-Americans
became white as a result of certain treaties involving the United
States and Mexico.143 In addition, as noted above, the government
of Mexico and the United States Department of State also pressured
the United States Census Bureau to reclassify Mexican-Americans
as white. 144 Thus, Mexico exerted political pressure to classify
Mexican-Americans as white.
Other factors operating in the larger society may have
contributed to the Mexican-American's legal classification as white.
Social scientists have described the ways that European immigrants
became whitened.' 45 According to the social science account, by the
1920s, scientific racism promoted the idea that real Americans were
white and real whites came from northwest Europe.'46 Accordingly,
the 1930 census distinguished immigrants (southern and eastern
Europeans) from "native" whites (northwestern Europeans). 47
Euroethnics became white in part because the war against facism led
to a more inclusive version of whiteness. 14 8 Anti-European racism
143 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
145 See Karen Brodkin Sacks, How Did Jews Become White Folks?, in RACE 78-
102 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994).
146 See id. at 81.
147 See id. at 82.
148 See id. at 87. See also ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF SCIENTIFIC
RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1 (1992) ("After World War 11 the painful
recognition of what had been inflicted in the name of race led to the discrediting
of racism in international politics and contributed to the decline and repudiation
of scientific racism in intellectual discourse.").
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lost respectability.149 Thus, the 1940 census did not distinguish
Euroetbnics from native whites."' 0 Euroethnics became white
because of an expanded notion of whiteness."'1 As noted above,
during this time period, the Census Bureau also changed the race of
Mexican-Americans to white. s2 Thus, this post-war expanded
notion of whiteness may have operated to reclassify Mexican-
Americans as white.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This essay has sought to examine a number of issues concerning
Mexican-Americans and whiteness. In particular it has sought to
explore how legal actors constructed the race of Mexican-
Americans. The record indicates that the law generally constructed
Mexican-Americans as white. Drawing on critical theory, the essay
explains why the legal definition of Mexican-Americans is
important. It also demonstrates that legal recognition of Mexican-
Americans as white failed to provide them with the benefits usually
associated with whiteness. This failure to receive such benefits has
implications for the affirmative action debate. The essay also has
shown how the Mexican-American's legal construction as white
contrasted with the colonial discourses of the American southwest
which characterized Mexican-Americans as racial Others. Despite
these colonial discourses establishing the Mexican-American as a
racial Other, the essay has argued that politics and other social
forces nevertheless operated to turn Mexican-Americans into
"whites" as a matter of law. Finally, the essay also has sought to
connect theory with practice. Toward that end, the essay has
suggested how some of the insights of critical theory may be useful
for litigators representing Mexican-Americans.
149 See Sacks, supra note 143, at 87.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.

